‘Naturally, I was prepared to launch. That was our purpose…’ Colonel Alexander Tarasenko These portraits explore background, characters and culture of those who prepared to end the world in the name of peace - from both sides of the ideological fence. From those who maintained and refueled Nuclear ICBMs, the combat crew who would make the final decisions to launch, to those higher up the chain of command responsible of the readiness of scores of missiles able to launch within seconds and end civilization in minutes. These are the men of RSVN Strategic Rocket Forces and USAF Strategic Air Command.
As nuclear weapons have not been detonated in anger since 1945 and even testing has reduced significantly, there is an argument for ICBMs as a tool of peace. However, no one denies that accidents have occurred and just one major error could cause an apocalypse.
As pressure mounts on the reduction of warhead numbers, development and replacement of weaponry still remain significant for all nuclear states and in particular for the two biggest players in nuclear armament; the Russian Federation and the USA. Between them they hold 96% of the worlds nuclear weapons.
The parallel lives of those from the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) and USAF Strategic Air Command (SAC) intertwine in their shared paradoxical success of a failure to complete their designated missions. Today their successors range many of the same weapons against each other. But common parlance has reduced the significance of their work to a mere ‘press of a button’ as we become habituated to a world where such missiles remain on 24 hour alert and these silent warriors would pass us in the street with little recognition.
For those willing to accept this controversial responsibility, there are plenty of deadly hazards and few rewards. There are no simplistic heroes to be lauded and nor is the enemy fully revealed in this kind of war, but dilemma is there every step of the way.
The responsibilities of those maintaining a nuclear armament cannot be greater, given the incredible complexity of the engineering feats required to send a missile into space at a moments notice, to land a warhead with spectacular accuracy thousands of miles away and the extreme consequences of accident, error or misjudgement. There is neither power to redirect ICBMs once launched nor are there self-destruct systems. The technology and effect of an ICBM exist on a scale so far removed from ordinary human experience that it’s effectively impossible to discuss them in anything but abstract terms.
In the US safeguards are in place designed to deter individual malfeasance. These include; the two-man policy, keys and codes to prevent unauthorized arming or detonation of the nuclear weapon. Nevertheless, in speaking those involved it has come to light that a one-man launch was possible in the US at least until the mid-eighties. SAC required the ability to counter attack after a strike to maintain Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) and this required the crew to be trained to bypass fail-safes.
Likewise, in order to ameliorate many Russian Generals fear of being unable respond to a first strike from the US it has also come to light that Soviets really did invent the Strangelovian “Doomsday Machineâ€. If a strike was detected and no response was forthcoming from the crews the “Perimitr†system was designed to detect and respond with an automated counter attack. Something they kept secret from the US administration contrary to the logic of MAD.
It would be difficult to deny these are the few who held the fate of the world in their hands.